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in order to insure that justice has been done, would 
be a matter of course.1 
[A] convicted defendant does not have a constitutional 
right to appeal under either the United States Constitution 
or the Minnesota Constitution . . . .2 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 1860, less than two years after the adoption of the 
Minnesota Constitution, Michael Dugan, a tavern owner in Anoka, “was 
brutally murdered by two lumberjacks from St. Paul who were passing 
through Anoka on their way to a hunting expedition.” 3  For this crime, 
Charlie Dumphey was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death by hanging.4 Before he was sentenced, however, Dumphey sought 
relief in the Minnesota Supreme Court, which heard argument on several 
claims, including an inadequate indictment, juror bias, and evidentiary error.5 
The court’s opinion reads like a decision of an appeal, but Dumphey had 
moved the court for a new trial, as he was allowed to do by statute, although 
the court denied his motion.6  Nonetheless, “the opinion was erudite and 
logical enough to sustain a sound decision.”7 Despite citing relatively little 
authority, “Justice Charles E. Flandreau dismissed the defendant’s arguments 
with admirable clarity, Holmesian brevity, and some unusually graceful legal 
writing.”8 
Dumphey illustrates the process of appellate review existing shortly 
after the Minnesota Constitution was adopted. Although the Dumphey court 
did not label it an “appeal,” the process provided plenary appellate review of 
a criminal conviction. 
Minnesota rules, and previously statutes, have provided criminal 
defendants a right to appellate review of conviction throughout the state’s 
history. 9 Minnesota appellate courts, nevertheless, reciting language from 
                                                 
 1  Roscoe Pound, Introduction to LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN 
AMERICA 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 1939). 
 2  Spann v. State, 704 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Minn. 2005) (but noting that the right to 
at least one review by direct appeal or postconviction review has been recognized in 
Minnesota). 
 3  Joel Samaha, A Case of Murder: Criminal Justice in Early Minnesota, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1975–76).  
 4  Id. at 1220. 
 5  Id. at 1222 n.11; see State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438 (1860). 
 6  Dumphey, 4 Minn. at 449. 
 7  See Samaha, supra note 3, at 1223. 
 8  Id.  
 9  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1); see Pub. St. 1863 ch. 117, § 1 (providing 
for removal to the supreme court within six months of conviction); cf. MINN. STAT. § 632.01 
(1978) (providing, before repeal in 1979 following adoption of the rules of criminal 
procedure, for removal of “criminal cases” to the supreme court following judgment by appeal 
2
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United States Supreme Court opinions dating back to 1894, have repeatedly 
stated that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appeal.10 
The “no constitutional right to appeal” rule has been criticized as ill-
founded dictum by several commentators, who not that the right is 
commonly granted by court rule or statute, and argue that the rule ignores the 
expansion of traditional common law forms of review.11 Justice Brennan, in 
a 1983 dissent, noted that “a case presenting this question [of a constitutional 
right to appeal] is unlikely to arise, for the very reason that a right of appeal 
is now universal for all significant criminal convictions.”12  
This article will examine the history of the treatment of claims to a 
right to appeal a criminal conviction, with specific reference to Minnesota.13 
It will explore whether the statements in appellate opinions that no such 
constitutional right exists are dicta, and examine the opinions in which the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has approached the point of declaring a right to a 
criminal appeal.14 It will examine the possible sources for a constitutional 
right to appeal a criminal conviction, and look at the possible consequences 
of recognizing such a right.15 Finally, this article will argue that saying “there 
                                                                                                                   
or writ of error). Minnesota statutes do not currently confer a right to appeal a criminal 
conviction, other than a first-degree murder conviction, although they do establish a right to 
appeal a criminal sentence. See MINN. STAT. § 244.11, subd. 1 (2012) (providing the right to 
appeal a sentence); id. § 632.14 (2012) (providing the right to appeal a first-degree murder 
sentence to the supreme court). The supreme court has indicated that the court, not the 
legislature, has the authority to grant or withhold a right to appeal. State v. Wingo, 266 
N.W.2d 508, 512 (Minn. 1978). 
 10  McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); see Deegan v. State, 711 
N.W.2d 89, 95 (Minn. 2006) (noting that the right to one review may be a “tradition unique to 
Minnesota” that is “arguably . . . grounded in the Minnesota Constitution,” but declining to 
decide whether there is a state constitutional right to an appeal). But see Larson v. State, 801 
N.W.2d 222, 227 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting the argument that Deegan recognizes a 
constitutional right to appeal). 
 11  See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 511–12 (1992); David Rossman, Were There No Appeal: The History 
of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 548 (1990); 
Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 
102–03 (1985); Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural 
Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 384–86 (1991); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and 
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–10 (1994) (discussing the “revisionist” view 
of the “no constitutional right to appeal” rule and arguing that at least one view of the federal” 
harmless error” rule cannot be reconciled with the lack of a constitutional right to appeal). 
 12  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Brennan also predicted that the Court, if squarely presented with the question, would 
recognize a constitutional right to appeal, or require the states to “afford at least some 
opportunity for review of convictions.” Id. 
 13  See infra notes 17–48 and accompanying text (examining the history of claims 
to a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction in America and Minnesota). 
 14  See infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text (exploring the dictum recited by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction). 
 15  See infra notes 70–164 and accompany text (identifying the sources of a 
constitutional right to appeal and the consequences of recognizing the right). 
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is no constitutional right to appeal” in criminal cases is a shibboleth.16 The 
frequent repetition of that statement has served only to obscure historical 
developments and constitutional logic that amply support recognizing the 
right. 
 
II.  HISTORY 
 
Despite the refusal to recognize a constitutional right to a criminal 
appeal, there is a rich history of review by appellate courts that functioned as 
“appellate” review of criminal convictions. These traditional forms of review 
were more appropriate for the common law traditions and the limited 
technology of the times than the full-record “appeal” that developed later. 
Thus, the omission from the Minnesota and United States Constitutions of a 
right to appeal may simply have reflected the ubiquity of the common law 
appeal equivalents and the unfamiliarity of the modern appeal process. In 
this regard, Minnesota’s history mirrored that of the rest of the country. 
 
A. Law in America 
 
 The law in America, following that of England, was slow to 
incorporate a right to appeal into either its civil or criminal jurisprudence. 
The United States Constitution conferred on the United States Supreme 
Court “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact.”17he form of review 
that would be recognizable today as an “appeal,” however, did not yet 
exist.18  
 “Appeals, through which a higher court reviews the entire case . . . 
and has the power to render a judgment based on an overall assessment of 
the quality of the verdict, were not part of the common law tradition.”19 In 
the nation’s early days however, there were procedures that approximated, or 
functioned as, criminal appellate review. Writs of error, the common law 
corrective remedy, were available in most of the original thirteen states.20 
Questions that arose during a criminal trial were often certified to a higher 
                                                 
 16  “Shibboleth” is defined as “[a] moral formula held tenaciously and 
unreflectingly, esp. a prohibitive one; a taboo.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed., 2012). 
 17  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. In England, there were three “modes of 
procedure” that were “more or less analogous” to a criminal appeal before that right was 
recognized—a writ of error, reservation of a case for a higher court at the discretion of the 
trial judge, and, in misdemeanors tried in the civil division, a motion for a new trial. JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 171–72 (2d ed. 
1890). 
 18  In the 18th and 19th centuries, in England and America, the courts used various 
“procedures that served some of the functions of the modern appeal.” These included circuit 
riding by the high court justices, post-conviction motions, trials before multi-judge panels, 
“executive and legislative review of criminal convictions,” trial de novo in a higher court, and 
writs of error. Meltzer, supra note 11, at 7. 
 19  Rossman, supra note 11, at 525. 
 20  See id. at 541–43. 
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court. 21  Cases were often tried before multi-judge panels, providing an 
exchange of views similar to that on an appellate court.22 As with criminal 
trials conducted by United States Supreme Court justices, these panels often 
included members of the highest state court.23 Thus, trials were presided 
over, in part, by the most skilled and learned judges, the very judges who 
would otherwise have sat in review of them.24 
 The common law writ of error provided only for review of “the 
record,” which, unlike the present-day appellate “record,” focused on the 
pleadings and other written submissions and did not include a transcript of 
the trial.25  The error had to be apparent on the face of the record, and, 
therefore, review did not fully extend to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, 
or the sufficiency of the evidence. 26  Review by writ of error was less 
thorough than in a modern appeal, but the present-day conception of an 
appeal based on a thorough review of a record that includes a transcript of 
the proceedings and extends to errors of both fact and law, had not been 
established. In general, even when appellate review included an examination 
going beyond the face of the record, it extended only to errors of law, not to 
errors of fact.27 
 Thus, the significance of the noun “appeal” was less firmly 
established than that of the adjective “appellate” derived from it.28 At an 
                                                 
 21  See id. at 563. 
 22  Id. at 560. 
 23  Id. 
 24  The trial of Aaron Burr on treason charges, for example, was presided over by 
Chief Justice John Marshall, not because of the extraordinary nature of the charges, but as part 
of Marshall’s circuit-riding duties. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC 
AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 183 (La. State Univ. Press. 2001). Marshall sat with a federal 
district court judge but was the presiding judge. Id. at 190. In the course of the trial, he wrote 
fifteen opinions “on a variety of procedural, evidentiary, and doctrinal matters.” Id. Marshall 
wrote to his fellow justices and solicited their opinions on critical questions, such as the 
doctrine of constructive treason. Id. at 197. 
 25  See Orfield, supra note 1, at 23–24. “Writs of error were the traditional format 
the common law provided for reviewing a lower court’s judgment. The writ was an 
independent action in a higher court, conceptually quite unlike a contemporary appeal.” 
Rossman, supra note 12, at 522 n.8. 
 26  Orfield, supra note 1, at 24. In a New Mexico case, a defendant convicted of 
murder had been shot before the fatal shot and could not have participated in the crime, but 
was held on a proceeding in error to be entitled only to a new trial. Edson R. Sunderland, The 
Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126, 140–41 (1927). 
 27 Orfield, supra note 1, at 78–79 (describing the gradual evolution of state 
appellate practice). 
 28  An 1893 legal dictionary did not define the noun “appeal,” and defined the 
verb form as a removal “to a higher court for review and retrial.” WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF LAW 64 (Flood and Co. 1893) (emphasis added). One commentator theorizes 
that there was a “culture of appeal” in colonial America that carried over from English law at 
the time, although in the common law there was no legal form that embodied the cultural 
concept. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 913, 
922–23 (1997). 
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early stage, the United States Supreme Court deferred to Congress’s 
definition of “appellate jurisdiction,” beginning in the Judiciary Act of 
1789.29 Courts did not infer a constitutional right to an appeal from the grant 
of a jurisdiction labeled “appellate.” 
 A statutory right to an appeal in a federal criminal case was not 
established until 1889, and the Judiciary Act of that year limited that right to 
capital cases.30 In 1891, the right was extended to other criminal cases, and 
the courts of appeal were established to handle this, as well as the civil, 
appellate caseload.31 
 
B. Practice in America  
 
 Not only was the law slow to recognize a process of appellate review 
based on a full record, but the means of presenting even the common law 
forms of appellate review were laborious. The deficiencies of writs of error, 
and other such forms, were destined to be disclosed by practical 
developments. 
 One commentator noted the difficulties of preparing a bill of 
exceptions in Missouri: 
 
Filing an appeal on a bill of exceptions required getting 
someone to write out, in longhand, a record of the evidence 
adduced at trial and of all the objections and motions and the 
court’s ruling on them . . . , as well as making copies, in 
longhand, of the indictment, the jury instructions, the final 
judgment, and any other official documents that were part of 
the trial record.32 
 
 The first typewriter produced on a large scale was introduced in 
1873.33 Official trial court reporters did not begin appearing in state courts 
until the late 19th century. 34  Thus, it would have been difficult, if not 
                                                 
 29  See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 119 (1847) (“[b]y the constitution of the 
United States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred 
upon it by act of Congress . . . .”). 
 30  Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656, 656. 
 31  Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5; 26 Stat. 826, 827–28. 
 32 Frank O. Bowman, III, Appeals in Civil War Era Missouri, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
349, 365 (2009–10). 
 33  See WILFRED A. BEECHING, CENTURY OF THE TYPEWRITER 32 (St. Martin’s 
Press 1974). The QWERTY keyboard was developed by 1874. Typing in Tompkins, THE 
HISTORY CENTER IN TOMPKINS COUNTY, http://ergo.human.cornell.edu/ 
ergoprojects/dea4702005/hctwebsite/sholes.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012)  Use of the 
typewriter did not spread widely until 1881, when the New York YWCA introduced typing 
classes.  BRUCE BLIVEN, JR., THE WONDERFUL WRITING MACHINE 58 (Random House 1954). 
 34  Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 (1993).  Gregg’s 
shorthand, the system that eventually predominated, was not introduced until 1888.  DORIS H. 
CRANK, ET AL., METHODS OF TEACHING SHORTHAND AND TRANSCRIPTION 7 (McGraw-Hill 
6
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impossible, to provide for an appeal based on a full record until that time. 
Moreover, although appellate court decisions were published in individual 
states from the early days of the republic, no national reporting system 
existed to facilitate the broader integration of judge-made law until the West 
Reporter System began in 1879.35 At the time, appellate practice before the 
United States Supreme Court relied far more on oral argument than on 
written briefs, which were not even required until 1884.36 
 Soon after these advances eased the practical barriers to modern 
appellate review, in 1889, the state of Washington became the first state to 
incorporate a right of appeal into its constitution.37 Soon thereafter, Congress 
began the process of enacting a federal statutory right to appeal with the 
Judiciary Act of 1889.38 
 
C. Minnesota Law 
 
The law in Minnesota followed a path similar to that of the rest of 
the country. 39  The Minnesota Constitution bestowed on the Minnesota 
Supreme Court “appellate jurisdiction in all cases.”40 The term “appeal” does 
not appear in the state constitution or in the debates at the constitutional 
conventions.41 The term “appellate jurisdiction” was soon held to refer to the 
nature of the jurisdiction conferred, not to the mode by which it was 
exercised.42 The term appears to have been copied from the United States 
Constitution’s grant of “appellate jurisdiction” to the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
1982). “[I]n old Missouri, there was no cadre of court reporters routinely taking notes of 
everything that transpired in every case.” Bowman, supra note 32, at 365.  
 35  See James H. Wyman, Freeing the Law: Case Reporter Copyright and the 
Universal Citation System, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 217, 228 (1996).  “States tended to publish 
their high court decisions very slowly; West published them fast . . . .”  LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 306 (Simon & Schuster, 3d ed. 2005). 
 36  William H. Rehnquist, From Webster to Word-Processing: The Ascendance of 
the Appellate Brief, 1 J. APP. PRACT. & PROC. 1, 2 (1999). 
 37 James E. Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to an Appeal: Guarding Against 
Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 375, 376 (1985). 
 38 See supra note 31. 
 39 See supra notes 17–37 and accompanying text (looking at the law and practice 
of the United States regarding the constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction). 
 40  MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 41  The term was used in discussing whether justices of the peace are officers of 
the judicial branch. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (DEMOCRATIC) 198 (Goodrich, 1857) (“Appeals may be taken from the [Justice 
of the Peace’s] Court to the District Court, in the same manner as they may be taken from the 
District Court to the Supreme Court.”). This, however, was merely a recognition of existing 
statutory procedures. In general, the reports of the constitutional debates “are quite barren of 
discussions on the merits of the various provisions.”  John E. Simonett, An Introduction to 
Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 239 (1994). 
 42  Tierney v. Dodge, 9 Minn. 166, 170 (1864). 
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Court.43 As with the members of the Supreme Court, the Minnesota justices, 
beginning in territorial days, “held trials and heard motions individually as 
district court judges and then re-assembled ‘en banc’ to sit as a supreme 
court.”44  
A statutory right to appeal existed in territorial days.45 A similar 
provision for removal “by the defendant to the supreme court by appeal or 
writ of error at any time within six months after conviction” existed at and 
following statehood.46 
 
D. Minnesota Practice 
 
Many practical difficulties attended a mid-19th century appeal in 
Minnesota, as elsewhere. The briefs in Dumphey, and other appeals of the 
Civil War era, written out in longhand and alleging, or denying, in 
formalistic fashion the existence of error below, confirm how cumbersome 
the appeals process was.47 Due in part to the practical problems of preserving 
the record and presenting the arguments in legible written form, the appellate 
process moved slowly; although the Minnesota Supreme Court produced 504 
majority opinions from 1858 to 1865, this was only a pace of about ten 
opinions per justice per year.48 
 
 
III.  “NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL” – DICTUM 
OFTEN ECHOED 
  
 These primitive conditions were eased by new legal and 
technological developments ushering in the modern age of appellate review 
based on a full record.49 At the same time, however, the highest courts of the 
                                                 
 43  The United States Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court “appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 44  Robert J. Sheran and Timothy J. Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in the 
Frontier Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 19 (1976). 
 45  1851 Terr. Laws ch. 129 §§ 213 (appeals from justice-of-the-peace courts to 
district court), 220 (appeal upon conviction to the Supreme Court). 
 46  1863 Gen. Laws ch. 117, § 1. Professor Joel Samaha describes the even-handed 
pretrial and trial procedures accorded the defendant in Anoka County following a brutal, 
drunken homicide, and the supreme court’s “erudite” appellate opinion in response to the 
defendant’s request to that court for a new trial. Samaha, supra note 3, at 1222–23 (citing 
State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 340 (Minn. 1860)). 
 47  The briefs are available in the Minnesota State Law Library. 
 48  Sheran and Baland, supra note 44, at 40. 
 49  See supra  notes 34–39 and accompanying text (describing the introduction of 
the typewriter and other practical developments, as well as the establishment of the federal 
courts of appeal). 
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state and the nation were taking their most decisive steps in rejecting a 
constitutional right to appeal.50  
 In 1894, the United States Supreme Court abruptly stated, without 
citation or analysis, that an appeal from a criminal conviction “was not at 
common law, and it is not now, a necessary element of due process of law.”51 
This statement could be traced back to 1805, although the Supreme Court 
then, in United States v. More, was construing the Judiciary Act, not the 
Constitution.52 In 1894, the McKane Court, whose opinion did not refer to 
the Constitution or any developments in the law since its enactment, 
appeared to be reciting the state of the common law, which did not recognize 
an “appeal.”53 Moreover, at the time McKane was decided, the parameters of 
“due process of law” had hardly been defined.54 
 In 1883, Justice William Mitchell declared in City of Minneapolis v. 
Wilkin that there was no right to appeal, except “where, as in this case, the 
right of review on a writ of certiorari exists.”55 Wilkin preceded the United 
States Supreme Court’s opinion in McKane, but it involved a civil 
condemnation matter.56 Perhaps for that reason, Minnesota courts have cited 
McKane, not Wilkin, in stating the “no constitutional right to appeal” rule in 
criminal cases.57 
 The “no constitutional right to appeal” statement, as applied to 
criminal cases, arises out of dictum.58 In McKane, the United States Supreme 
Court was deciding only a question of bail pending appeal.59 The tenuous 
                                                 
 50  Judge Jack Nordby has argued that in some areas, such as the right to privacy, 
constitutional law “must adapt to rapid technological developments.”  Jack Nordby, Thirty-
two Reflections on the Birth, Slumber, and Reawakening of the Minnesota Constitution, 20 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 261 (1994). 
 51  McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). 
 52  See United States v. More, 7 U.S. 159, 171 (1805). 
 53  See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining the United States Supreme 
Court’s statement that a right to appeal criminal convictions was not part of the common law). 
 54  See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102–04 (1877) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause “has rarely been invoked,” protesting that the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process guarantee was being invoked much too often, and stating that the 
meaning of the term would have to be developed “by the gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion”). In the late 19th century, the concept of “due process” still generally followed 
“settled English usage at common law,” at least to the extent that any common law usage 
would not be held to be in violation of due process. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
246–48 (BOBBS-MERRILL 1926). 
 55  City of Minneapolis v. Wilkin, 14 N.W. 581, 583 (Minn. 1883). 
 56  Id. at 581. 
 57  See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 449 (Minn. 2006) (Anderson, J., 
concurring); State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Minn. 1988) (Wahl, J., dissenting), 
superseded by rule, Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 2010); State v. Meyer, 37 
N.W.2d 3, 15 n.12 (Minn. 1949). There appear to be no Minnesota criminal cases citing 
Wilkin for this principle in a criminal case. 
 58  See supra text accompanying notes 53–54 (providing the cases to which the 
“no constitutional right to appeal” rule is cited). 
 59  See McKane, 153 U.S. at 686. 
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origins of this rejection of a constitutional right to appeal, however, have not 
prevented courts from frequently citing McKane.60 
 The “no constitutional right to appeal” rule was not only born as 
dictum, but reflected the customs and practices of a time that was already 
passing.61 A decade before the McKane Court stated that a right to appeal 
“was not at common law, and it is not now, a necessary element of due 
process of law,” the Supreme Court itself had rejected the argument that due 
process was defined by “settled usage.”62 As the Court characterized it, to do 
so would be “to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it 
incapable of progress or improvement.” 63  The McKane rule was heavily 
dependent on “settled usage” that was rapidly outmoded by developing 
technology. The McKane rule, however, became so engrained and the 
availability of statutory and rule-based appeals so ubiquitous that the rule 
was merely repeated.64 When the Minnesota Supreme Court has occasionally 
been confronted with an argument that a right to appeal has been violated, it 
has responded with the McKane rule that denial of an appeal does not violate 
due process or any other constitutional right.65 The court, in citing McKane 
in criminal cases, usually on a tangential point, has always done so without 
analysis.66 
 These frequent repetitions cannot obscure the doubtful origins of the 
“no constitutional right to appeal” rule. Minnesota’s lockstep reliance on the 
McKane rule is ripe for reexamination.67 The reexamination offered here will 
                                                 
 60  See, e.g., Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 611 (Minn. 2012); Rickert v. State, 
795 N.W.2d 236, 246–47 (Minn. 2011). 
 61  See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text (looking at the type of language 
cited by Minnesota courts when stating that there is no constitutional right to appeal). 
 62  McKane, 153 U.S. at 687; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884). 
 63  Id. at 529. 
 64  See infra note 65 and accompanying text (listing cases in which the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has cited McKane). 
 65  See State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368, 375 (Minn. 1988) (Wahl, J., dissenting) 
(right to self-representation on appeal); State ex rel. Mastrian v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 786, 789 
n.2 (1967) (three-year delay in completing trial transcript); State v. Lorenz, 50 N.W.2d 270, 
271 (1951) (denying payment of expenses of indigent’s appeal); State v. Meyer, 37 N.W.2d 3, 
15 n.12 (1949) (Youth Conservation Act). 
 66  See Seifert, 423 N.W.2d at 375 (Wahl, J., dissenting); Mastrian, 152 N.W.2d at 
789 n.2; Lorenz, 50 N.W.2d at 271; Meyer, 37 N.W.2d at 15 n.12. The court in O’Rourke 
analyzes the issue at some length, including its due process ramifications, and quotes at length 
from the discussion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In re O’Rourke, 220 N.W.2d 
811, 822–23 (1974). However, there is no analysis of McKane, the genesis of the rule, in 
O’Rourke, and, although Griffin is a criminal case, the majority opinion and Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence, supplemented by history rather than precedent, cite McKane 
without analysis. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20–21. 
 67  One commentator on state constitutionalism describes a process of “path 
dependence,” in which state courts depend on the direction federal constitutional law has 
taken, without exploring alternatives. Lawrence Friedman, Path Dependence and the External 
Constraints on Independent State Constitutionalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 783, 803–04 
(2011). Friedman states that “[e]xperience shows that a state court is likely, more often than 
not, to rely upon a doctrinal framework developed by the federal courts.” Id. at 804. 
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go beyond the criticism of McKane and explore whether, despite McKane’s 
precedential sway, a state constitutional right to appeal should be recognized 
under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s standards for departing from federal 
precedent.68 
 
 
IV.  RECOGZNIZING THE RIGHT – OR AT LEAST TAKING A 
FRESH LOOK 
 
A. Difficulties 
 
The “no constitutional right to appeal” rule, at a minimum, is 
supported by the lack of an explicit constitutional provision of the right. The 
right may have a “textual hook” in article VI, section 2 of the Minnesota 
Constitution, which confers “appellate jurisdiction” on the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.69 That language, however, has been rejected as a source for a 
constitutional right to an appeal.70 The right cannot be established merely by 
the ubiquity of the procedure or its familiarity.71 
In 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected article VI, section 
2’s grant of “appellate jurisdiction” as a basis of a constitutional right to 
appeal. Although it involved a civil appeal, O’Rourke held that “[t]he 
Minnesota Constitution does not by express word or by necessary 
implication impose on this court the duty to hear an appeal in all cases.”72 
                                                 
 68  In Kahn v. Griffin, the Minnesota Supreme Court set out the standards for 
departure from federal constitutional precedents.  Some of these standards, such as whether 
there has been a federal departure from precedent, clearly do not apply here.  In the “decision 
tree” established by Kahn, the question of a constitutional right to appeal comes down to 
whether “federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties.”  Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828.  See Paul H. Anderson & Julie Oseid, A Decision Tree 
Takes Root In the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual 
Rights Under Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 868 
(2007) (describing the “decision tree” created by Kahn). 
 69  See MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 70  A. Christopher Bryant, What McDonald Means for Unenumerated Rights, 45 
GA. L. REV. 1073, 1091 (2010) (distinguishing rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and 
those “lacking such a textual hook”). 
 71  Justice Frankfurter repeated de Tocqueville’s warning against confusing the 
familiar with the necessary. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The right to 
an appeal from a conviction for crime is today so established that this leads to the easy 
assumption that it is . . . a necessary ingredient of due process of law.”). 
 72  O’Rourke, 220 N.W.2d at 812, 815. The O’Rourke court did not address 
whether the Minnesota Constitution, by extending “appellate jurisdiction” to “all cases,” had 
conferred a right to appeal, but it distinguished between its own power of review and any duty 
to hear a particular type of appeal. Id. at 817–18. The State Public Defender’s Office (SPDO) 
wrote an amicus brief in O’Rourke arguing that there was a state constitutional right to appeal. 
Without referring specifically to criminal appeals, the SPDO brief argued that statements in 
case law to the contrary were dictum or were belied by their actual holdings. The O’Rourke 
court read the brief as admitting that there was no case on point recognizing a constitutional 
right to appeal. Id. O’Rourke adopted a construction of the phrase “appellate jurisdiction” that 
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In contrast to this lack of explicit constitutional language recognizing 
a right to appeal, the “no constitutional right to appeal” rule has been stated 
explicitly, even categorically, in McKane, Wilkin, and succeeding cases.73 On 
the surface, the quest for recognition of the right, therefore, might appear 
hopeless. Yet, a mere citation to dictum, however categorically stated, does 
not prevent a fresh look based on sound principles. 
Although the absence of explicit constitutional language warrants 
caution, it does not rule out the recognition of such a right to appeal. The 
right to appeal does not necessitate resorting to the “penumbra” of other 
constitutional provisions, as with other unenumerated constitutional rights.74 
Some of the most prominent “rights” within the criminal process are not 
grounded in explicit constitutional language.75 For instance, the United States 
Constitution makes no mention of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the 
presumption of innocence.76 In Winship, the United States Supreme Court 
traced the progress of these principles from legal axioms to recognized 
requirements of due process.77 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
found a limited state constitutional right to counsel before submitting to 
chemical testing and a right to a jury of twelve without explicit bases in the 
state constitution for either right.78 
                                                                                                                   
was consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s construction of the same phrase in the 
United States Constitution. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall held that issuing a 
writ of mandamus did not fall within the Supreme Court’s “appellate jurisdiction” because 
“the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction . . . [is] that it revises and corrects the 
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803). Under this broad definition, a writ of error or a writ of 
certiorari could be viewed as an exercise of “appellate jurisdiction.” The term had no 
necessary relationship to modern notions of an appeal. 
 73  See McKane, 153 N.W.2d at 687; Wilkin, 14 N.W. at 583; Spann, 704 N.W.2d 
at 491 (stating that “[a]lthough a convicted defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
appeal under either the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution,” in 
Minnesota there is a right to one review). 
 74  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing cases in which the right to 
privacy has been found in the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 484–85, (1965) (citing cases “suggest[ing] that specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance”). An appeal is a legal process of a type not completely unknown to the 
common law. It is not an abstract idea, like the right to privacy, needing to be discovered 
within another abstraction. “Appellate jurisdiction” was a concept known to the framers of 
both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. 
 75  Many of the unenumerated rights that have been recognized have been at least 
partially derived from the Ninth Amendment, which provides that the enumeration of certain 
rights in the Constitution is not meant to exclude other, unenumerated rights not included in 
that document. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. There is no direct counterpart to that amendment in 
the Minnesota Constitution. 
 76  See U.S. CONST. 
 77  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970). 
 78  Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 836–37 (Minn. 1991) 
(finding that drivers had a right to counsel, despite conflicting precedent, based in part on 
Minnesota’s history of “procedural protection for the rights of the criminally accused”); State 
v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988) (holding, based in part on 1869 decision, that 
12
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B. Staring Down Stare Decisis 
 
Even assuming there are adequate implicit sources for a state 
constitutional right to appeal, the principle of judicial restraint, reflected in 
the tradition of stare decisis, “directs that [the courts] adhere to former 
decisions in order that there might be stability in the law.”79 This doctrine is 
to be taken even more seriously in matters of constitutional law. 80  The 
doctrine of stare decisis, however, does not bind the court to unsound 
principles. “[W]hen a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has 
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social 
welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full 
abandonment.”81 Accordingly, stare decisis does not require adherence to the 
McKane dictum, despite its long tenure.82 
 
 
V.  SOUND PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Public Policy Favoring “One Corrective Review” 
  
 A widely acknowledged public policy argument supports 
recognizing a constitutional right to a criminal appeal. This argument goes 
much further than policy arguments generally could because it has already 
yielded a quasi-constitutional right to “one corrective review.”83 
 In July and August of 1913, Leo Frank was tried in Fulton County, 
Georgia, for the murder of Mary Phagan.  The trial was attended by a throng 
so hostile that, before beginning the final instructions to the jury, the trial 
judge told Frank and his attorney, in the words of the dissenting Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, that there would be a “‘probable danger of violence’ 
if there should be an acquittal or a [hung jury].”84  The Georgia Supreme 
                                                                                                                   
drafters of the state constitution assumed a trial by jury meant a jury of twelve people), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, as recognized in Danforth 
v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (2009). 
 79  Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000). 
 80  Simonett, supra note 41, at 239 (stating that constitutional law “professes to 
take stare decisis more seriously than the common law”). 
 81  Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
150 (1921)). 
 82  See State v. Lessley, 779 N.W.2d 825, 836 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that the 
jury-trial waiver provision in article I, section 4 of the state constitution did not apply to 
criminal cases, and so a waiver would not require the prosecution’s consent, citing what had 
been described as “considered dictum”). The dissent, however, concluded that the prior 
“dictum” had been offered with substantial support. Id. at 840–41 n.1. 
 83  See infra notes 86–97 and accompanying text (explaining how the United 
States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledge the “one corrective 
review” right). 
 84  Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Frank 
and defense counsel agreed and were absent when the guilty verdict was read. 
13
Keillor: Criminal Appeals in Minnesota
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
412 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
Court affirmed the conviction, and on appeal from the denial of a federal 
habeas corpus petition, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that 
“if the state, supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a 
judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by 
mob domination, the state deprives the accused of his life or liberty without 
due process of law.”85 
 Georgia’s state appellate review in Frank was ineffectual. The public 
policy served by affording review of a criminal conviction, however, has 
since been recognized in case law as supporting the right to “one corrective 
process” to review a criminal conviction. 86  That right is embodied in 
Minnesota’s postconviction review statute.87 
 In Case v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged the principle that convicted criminals have a right to one 
“corrective process.”88 Only Justice Clark’s concurring opinion suggested the 
Court adopt it as a rule. 89  Justice Brennan’s concurrence argued for a 
“sufficiently comprehensive” state postconviction remedy that would 
“embrace all federal constitutional claims,” but the per curiam majority 
opinion expressed no view on this point.90 
 In the 1976 Knaffla decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed 
Case in acknowledging a right to one review of a criminal conviction, 
whether by direct appeal or postconviction review.91 With the Minnesota 
postconviction statute already vindicating such a right, however, it was 
unnecessary to explore its constitutional roots. 92  Knaffla recognized that 
                                                 
 85  Id. at 335 (emphasis added).  The majority opinion relied heavily on the fact 
that the Georgia Supreme Court had reviewed the conviction.  Justice Holmes’ dissent argued 
that the working of a “state corrective procedure” did not resolve the constitutional question 
that confronted the federal courts.  Id. at 347.  Holmes’ view later prevailed in Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
 86  See Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 95 (recognizing the right to one review, if 
not constitutional in nature, as a “tradition unique to Minnesota.” (citing Kahn v. Griffin, 701 
N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005)). 
 87  MINN. STAT. ch. 590. 
 88  Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965). In Case, the Supreme Court 
granted review to address the lack of a corrective process in Nebraska, a deficiency that, as in 
other states, had made federal habeas corpus the only means of obtaining review of claims of 
federal constitutional violations in a state criminal proceeding. Id. Before the Court decided 
Case, however, the Nebraska legislature had enacted a postconviction-remedy statute. Id. 
Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether such a remedy was constitutionally 
required. The Court’s per curiam opinion merely remanded for reconsideration in light of the 
new postconviction statute. See id. at 337–40 (possibly suggesting a positive answer to the 
question on which certiorari had been granted—whether the Fourteenth Amendment required 
the states to provide “some adequate corrective process”). 
 89  Case, 381 U.S. at 337–40 (suggesting a positive answer to the question of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment required the states to provide “some adequate corrective 
process,” the question on which the Court granted certiorari). 
 90  Id. at 347. 
 91  State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). 
 92  Id. at 740–41. 
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Case did not provide “clear direction,” only an “implication,” of a right to 
one review.93 
 The Case-based right to one corrective process, whether by direct 
appeal or postconviction collateral attack, recognizes how essential review is 
to the fair administration of criminal justice. It suffers, however, from two 
flaws:  (1) its constitutional basis is not clearly established, and (2) it can be 
satisfied by a postconviction collateral proceeding that is more limited than a 
direct appeal. The right Case recognized was only quasi-constitutional, as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Deegan.94 It was developed only in 
concurring opinions, leaving its precedential authority unclear.95 
 The Case right to one corrective process is also deficient because it 
may be satisfied by a state postconviction process of narrow scope and 
questionable efficacy when compared to direct appeal. In Minnesota, the 
postconviction petitioner is not statutorily entitled to a hearing, only a 
presumption in favor of a hearing.96 The petition is frequently assigned to the 
same judge who presided over the trial or guilty plea. 97  Thus, a 
postconviction proceeding is often a paper review of trial or guilty plea 
proceedings conducted by the same decision-maker. Furthermore, if the 
defendant had directly appealed, he has no right to counsel in postconviction 
proceedings.98 
 Thus, the Minnesota postconviction remedy is a limited one. 
Although it serves as a strong reflection of the public policy supporting a 
constitutional right to appeal, the postconviction remedy is not an adequate 
substitute for an appeal. 
 
B. Procedural Due Process 
 
 Another prominent source for a state constitutional right to appeal a 
criminal conviction dwells in the Minnesota Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause.99 Due process requires certain minimal procedures before a liberty or 
property interest can be infringed by state action.100 A criminal defendant 
                                                 
 93 Id. at 740 (citing Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (Minn. 1965)) (noting that 
there was no clear majority in Case, and that it did not provide clear direction as to the right of 
review, but that its implication was that there was a right to one corrective process of review). 
 94  Deegan, 711 N.W.2d at 93 (stating that “the Court never issued a decision on 
the issue for which it granted certiorari,” but the opinion implied that convicted criminals have 
a right to at least one state corrective process to determine claims of violations of federal 
constitutional rights). 
 95  See supra text accompanying note 89 (showing that the concurring opinion 
pushed for the one “corrective process” right be adopted as a rule). 
 96  MINN. STAT. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). 
 97  Cf. Johnson v. State, 486 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
postconviction petitioners are not entitled to automatically judge who presided over the trial). 
 98  MINN. STAT. § 590.05 (2010). 
 99  See MINN. CONST. art 1, sec. 7. 
 100  See State v. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d 504, 512 (Minn. 2009) (discussing what 
process is due to a criminal defendant facing pretrial detention). 
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facing incarceration has the most fundamental liberty interest at stake in 
avoiding conviction.101 
 In determining what minimal procedures are due, Minnesota follows 
the Mathews balancing test, which considers: (1) the private interest affected 
by official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest under 
existing procedures and the probable value of other procedures, and (3) the 
governmental interest, including the burdens that would be imposed by the 
alternative procedures.102 
 The private interest in personal liberty affected by a criminal 
conviction is of a high order.103 The risk of erroneous deprivation of the right 
to personal liberty through trial proceedings conducted by trained judicial 
officers, where there is a recognized right to counsel and other constitutional 
safeguards, may not be as high as with, for example, administrative 
decisions. 104  The rate of reversal of criminal convictions provides some 
guideline for estimating the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty. In 
Minnesota, that rate has not been high, but it has been significant.105 
 Thus, the benefits of appeal as an additional procedure have been 
proven over time.106 Due process, of course, does not require procedures that 
                                                 
 101  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (recognizing the 
fundamental nature of the freedom from restraint, particularly from restraint by one’s own 
government); cf. LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d at 512 (holding that even pretrial detention under 
conditions of release implicates a liberty interest). 
 102  Fosselman v. Comm’r of Human Servs., 612 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The United States Supreme 
Court has declined to apply the Mathews balancing test to assess state procedural rules in 
criminal prosecutions. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). Still, a state could use 
the test to assess whether its own procedures satisfy the state constitution’s due process 
guarantee. 
 103  See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (describing a criminal 
defendant’s liberty interest as “an interest of transcending value”); LeDoux, 770 N.W.2d at 
512 (stating that a defendant before trial “has a strong liberty interest in not being confined.”). 
 104  See generally Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (noting that 
“procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge.”). 
 105  In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the reversal rate in defense appeals 
(primarily appeals from conviction) for the last five years has ranged from 7.1% (2011) to 
12.2 % (2009). E-mail from Craig Hagensick, Research Analyst II, Court Services, Minnesota 
Supreme Court (Nov. 29, 2012). These figures exclude sentencing relief but include some 
reversals that do not affect the conviction. One commentator estimates that in non-capital 
cases the national “error rate” in state court is “certainly less than 15% and probably far less 
than 10%.” James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2053 
n. 90 (2000). Justice Brennan, in a dissent, has commented that the reversal rate of state 
criminal convictions, “while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that 
depriving criminal defendants of their right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable 
risk of erroneous conviction.”  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n. 1 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 106  Appeals provide a benefit not only to defendants in the reversal of erroneous 
convictions, but also to society in enhancing the public confidence in criminal convictions, 
and in the development of law, particularly procedural protections at the pretrial and trial 
stages that reduce the risk of erroneous convictions. See Spann, 704 N.W.2d at 493 (noting 
that when the defendant’s interest in challenging his conviction is put aside, “institutional 
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eliminate all possibility of error.107 The adversarial process already afforded 
at the trial stage is recognized as the best means of minimizing the risk of 
error.108 Yet adversarial trials may be fundamentally flawed, as when the 
defendant represents himself, or when structural error occurs. Moreover, if 
conviction is based on proof that fails to meet the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard, even a fair trial violates due process.109 
 Finally, the governmental cost of providing an appeal to criminal 
defendants is relatively low. The constitutional amendment establishing the 
court of appeals was promoted based on the large volume of appeals that 
burdened the supreme court. 110  The appellate court’s establishment has 
expanded the capacity of the judicial system for efficient appellate review. In 
addition, the government itself has an interest in ensuring that criminal 
judgments have widespread public respect, an interest served by appellate 
review.111 
 As a source for a state constitutional right to appeal, however, 
procedural due process faces at least two difficulties:  (1) the supreme court 
has not expanded on federal due process protections, and (2) Minnesota’s 
Due Process Clause is considerably less specific than the constitutional 
provisions to which courts are accustomed to looking for criminal procedural 
rights.112 
 Going beyond federal due process. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
has held that the due process protections under the Minnesota Constitution 
                                                                                                                   
concerns that the conviction was fair and proper become paramount” and that allowing a 
defendant to waive his right to appeal would “foster a judicial system that discourages 
development of the law while encouraging the preservation of unfair trials”). 
 107  Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
 108  Id. 
 109  State v. Clow, 600 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (addressing the 
sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal because due process prevents 
conviction based on proof that does not meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard). 
 110  Judge Harriet Lansing, Twenty-Five Years of Doing Minnesota Justice, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1244, 1246 (2009) (noting that the “precipitating cause” for the court’s 
creation was “an overwhelming deluge of appellate filings”).  Of course, the creation of the 
court eliminated the system of district court appeal panels that had handled appeals from 
county courts, but this applied only to misdemeanor cases.  See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.01, subd. 
2 (1980). 
 111 Lester Orfield identifies two other functions of an appeal in addition to 
ensuring that justice is done to the individual defendant: (1) ensuring that consistent standards 
are maintained in the trial courts, and (2) developing the law of the jurisdiction. Orfield, supra 
note 1, at 33–34. These benefits accrue to the judicial system rather than to the individual 
defendant, and so are properly viewed as an offset of the governmental costs in the Mathews 
balancing test. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining the Mathews balancing 
test for adequate procedural due process). 
 112  See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (noting the United States 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to expand due process in criminal prosecutions beyond specific 
Bill of Rights guarantees). 
17
Keillor: Criminal Appeals in Minnesota
Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013
416 HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
 
are identical to those provided under the United States Constitution.113 That 
rule may not be ironclad, as it is difficult to accept that in the wide realm of 
procedural due process there are no “language, concerns, or traditions unique 
to Minnesota” that would justify a different application of the state 
provision.114  One of those exceptions should be the right to one review, 
described as a “tradition unique to Minnesota.” 115 Still, adherence to federal 
law poses a barrier to relying on the state Due Process Clause alone to 
support a right to appeal.  
 The public policy statements noted previously demonstrate that the 
right to appeal is an essential element of our criminal justice system. 
Unfortunately, because the statutory and rule-based right to appeal is so 
longstanding, statements as to the constitutional basis for a right to appeal 
have fallen far behind the public policy statements that would support them. 
 Yet, the United States Supreme Court, in determining what 
procedures the Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires, has frequently 
looked to the procedures provided by the states. 116  The Court has 
acknowledged “the importance of history and widely shared practice as 
concrete indicators of what fundamental fairness and rationality require.”117 
Because interpretation of the United States Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause itself looks to some degree to state practice, Minnesota should not 
ignore its own traditions in construing the Minnesota Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause. 
 Generality of the due process right. The second difficulty with 
relying on procedural due process is judicial reluctance to rely on so general 
a right in this area. The United States Supreme Court has been particularly 
reluctant to use procedural due process generally—and the Mathews 
balancing test specifically—to supplement the explicit criminal procedural 
safeguards in the Bill of Rights. In 1992, the Court in Medina v. California 
                                                 
 113  McCollum v. State, 640 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Minn. 2002) (citing Sartori v. 
Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988)). 
 114  Cf. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn. 2005). The tradition in 
Minnesota, for example, of providing a right to appeal by statute, and of carefully 
safeguarding that right, offers a reason to recognize such a right. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court has looked to state tradition when deciding to give criminal defendants more expansive 
protection under the Minnesota Constitution than they have been afforded under the United 
States Constitution. Id. For example, in recognizing a stricter standard for a Miranda waiver 
of the right to counsel than that applied by the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has cited Minnesota’s “long tradition of assuring the right to counsel.” State v. 
Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Friedman v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 
N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1991)). Friedman, in turn, recognized a greater right to counsel 
under the Minnesota Constitution than had been afforded by the United States Constitution. 
Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 833. Of course, extending the right to appeal to criminal defendants 
is not unique to Minnesota. 
 115  Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Minn. 2006) (citing Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 
825). 
 116  See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of ‘Evolving Standards’, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 365, 380–81 (2009). 
 117  Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991). 
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held that so-called “free-standing due process,” exemplified by Mathews, has 
only a limited operation in criminal procedure.118 The Court relied heavily on 
the need for federal deference to the “considerable expertise [of the states] in 
matters of criminal procedure.” 119  It noted that “[h]istorical practice is 
probative of whether a procedural rule can be characterized as 
fundamental.”120 
 Federal deference to states’ expertise, in preference to “freestanding 
due process,” should not deter Minnesota from recognizing a state 
constitutional right to a criminal appeal. State expertise, as reflected by 
“[h]istorical practice” in Minnesota and other states dating back to the 19th 
century, would favor recognizing the right to appeal as an essential element 
of due process.121 
  As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, due process is 
“perhaps . . . the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to 
history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive 
society.”122 The McKane rule, however, perpetuates the forms and practices 
of the common law in early America. 123  The longstanding Minnesota 
practice of providing an appeal adds some justification for departing from the 
McKane “no constitutional right to appeal” rule. 
 
C. Structural Error and Sufficiency Review 
 
The procedural due process argument finds strong support in the 
doctrine of structural error, which presupposes an appeal in which such error 
can be discovered and addressed. 124  Similarly, the incorporation of the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” proof standard into appellate review 
emphasizes how intrinsic appellate review is to a fair trial process. The 
doctrine of structural error, in holding that some types of error can never be 
                                                 
 118  Medina, 505 U.S. at 443. The majority opinion acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court had applied Mathews in two criminal cases, but held that reliance on the “open-ended 
rubric” of the Due Process Clause would invite undue interference with the legislative 
judgments of the states and threaten to undo the “careful balance that the Constitution strikes 
between liberty and order.” Id. 
 119  Id. at 445. 
 120  Id. at 446. 
 121  The right to a criminal appeal does not have “deep roots in our common law 
heritage,” but it does have longstanding (although more recent), universal recognition, 
whether by statute, rule, or state constitutional provision, in almost all fifty states. Id. at 447. 
 122  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(quoted in Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Ironically, however, Justice 
Frankfurter wrote these words in the course of rejecting the claim that due process required 
the states to provide review of criminal judgments. 
 123  See supra text accompanying notes 58–59 (detailing the McKane “no 
constitutional right to review” rule). 
 124  The doctrine of structural error is most fully developed in Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290–92 (1991). Minnesota has applied the doctrine to a number of 
different types of error. See State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 253 (Minn. 2005) (biased 
factfinder); State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 1992) (closure of courtroom). 
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harmless, illustrates the degree to which appellate review is essential to the 
fair trial guarantee.125 Appellate review is essential to discover error that is 
structural, absent an admission of error by the trial court and the grant of a 
new trial. The doctrine therefore presupposes the availability of appellate 
review.126 
The presumption of appellate review is also built into the federal 
case law on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that the Winship due process right to be 
convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires more than a 
“trial ritual” in which the jury is instructed on the reasonable doubt 
standard. 127  Due process also requires that a post-trial review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence incorporate the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard.128 Further, if the sufficiency of the evidence must be reviewed in 
light of the Winship “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, by implication 
there is a right of review of the conviction. The Supreme Court implied as 
much in Jackson v. Virginia, stating that “when such a conviction [based on 
proof not satisfying the Winship standard] occurs in a state trial, it cannot 
constitutionally stand.”129 
Of course, a criminal defendant may waive the right to a trial 
altogether. Nevertheless, there is a public interest in the fair determination of 
guilt or innocence.130  There is also a public interest in the rational and 
consistent development of the law. 131  That interest is served by a 
constitutional right to appellate review of structural error and sufficiency of 
                                                 
 125  In Fulminante, the Supreme Court took an appellate perspective on structural 
error by focusing on defects in the trial process “which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ 
standards.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. It contrasted these with errors that could be 
“quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence,” again from an appellate perspective. 
Id. at 308. 
 126  Of course, any doctrine applied only, or mainly, on appellate review 
presupposes the availability of that review.  The doctrine of harmless error, however, may be 
applied by the district court in ruling on a new-trial motion.  See State v. French, 402 N.W.2d 
805, 809 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).  Structural error “undermines the structural integrity of the 
criminal tribunal itself.”  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).  It may involve error, 
such as bias in the factfinder, that only an appellate court could realistically review.  See 
Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 253.   
 127  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1979). 
 128  Id. at 318. 
 129  Id. at 317–18. 
 130  See Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural 
Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 386 (1991) ( “[T]he right to appeal to a certain degree 
assures defendants, as well as the rest of the populace, that individuals will be treated fairly by 
the justice system.”). 
 131  See Rossman, supra note 11, at 518 (noting that “[a] great deal of the force that 
drives the ‘terrible engine’ of the criminal law is supplied by courts that consider cases on 
review after a defendant has been convicted”). See also Note, supra note 130, at 386 (“On a 
more systemic level, appellate courts develop and refine legal principles and ensure that these 
principles are applied consistently.”). 
20
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss3/3
2013] CRIMINAL APPEALS IN MINNESOTA 419 
 
 
 
the evidence.132 Only the decisions of appellate courts can ensure uniform 
application of the law.133 
 
D. A “Privileged” Right 
 
 The right to a criminal appeal is not only an implicit component of 
procedural due process and the doctrines of structural error and sufficiency 
of the evidence review. Its constitutional stature is also implied by the 
holding that a criminal defendant cannot, by agreement with the state 
following trial, waive his right to appeal.134 
In Spann, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he right 
to appeal implicates not only matters personal to the defendant, but broader 
issues as well. Once the defendant is convicted, institutional concerns that 
the conviction was fair and proper become paramount.”135 Spann held that 
the right to appeal, although not constitutional in nature, is of sufficient 
importance that criminal defendants cannot waive it by agreement with the 
state following trial.136 
By contrast, some of the most fundamental constitutional rights, such 
as the right to a jury trial, and the right of confrontation, may be freely 
waived, assuming an adequate on-the-record inquiry. 137  In the federal 
                                                 
 132  This public interest is also exemplified by the seldom-used doctrine of 
abatement ab initio, which is applied in many states when the defendant dies during the 
pendency of an appeal.  See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 760 (Alaska 2011).  The doctrine is 
based on the notion that a defendant whose death has deprived him of an appeal should have 
his conviction vacated because the validity of the conviction has not been fully tested.  See 
Annotation, Abatement of State Criminal Case by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of 
Conviction – Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R. 4th 189 (1990).  Even some courts that reject the 
doctrine acknowledge “that an appeal plays an integral part in the judicial system for a final 
adjudication of guilt or innocence and . . . a defendant who dies pending appeal should not be 
deprived of the safeguards that an appeal provides.”  State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 
413 (Wis. 1988). 
 133  See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 453 (1963) (“In a unitary jurisdiction appellate review 
provides authoritative and uniform pronouncements on the law of that jurisdiction.”). 
“Appeal, then, serves that aspect of justice which tells us that the same law ought to apply to 
different people similarly circumstanced . . . .” Id. at 454. 
 134  Spann, 704 N.W.2d at 493 (concluding that “based on public policy and due 
process considerations, that a defendant may not, after conviction at trial and sentencing, 
waive the right to appeal”). The court acknowledged, however, that a defendant may waive 
the right to appeal by failing to file an appeal, or by failing to object to an error at trial. Id. at 
491. 
 135  Id. at 492. 
 136  Id. at 494–95. Few other rights, even those of constitutional dimension, have 
been similarly elevated to the status where they cannot in certain circumstances be waived. 
The Spann court recognized that it had previously held that sentencing under the guidelines, 
although not a right of the defendant, was so essential to public policy that it could not be 
waived. Id. at 494 (citing State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2002)). 
 137  Spann, 704 N.W.2d at 494. 
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system, statutory provisions are presumed subject to waiver, and the rules of 
criminal procedure are “presumptively waivable.”138 
This evidences that the right to appeal, although not recognized as 
constitutional, is intrinsically privileged. There are other ways in which the 
right to appeal has been accorded a privileged status. The right to appeal has 
been privileged indirectly, by application of the due process doctrine of 
prosecutorial vindictiveness to a prosecutor’s re-charging after a successful 
appeal, when that doctrine has not been applied as strictly in the pretrial 
context.139 
The United States Supreme Court’s recognition of an indigent 
defendant’s right to appointed counsel on appeal, and the right to a transcript 
at public expense, while based on equal protection and due process grounds, 
have effectively elevated the right to appeal to at least quasi-constitutional 
status.140 Further, the American Bar Association Standards recognize that 
criminal defendants should have a right to appeal from a final judgment.141 
The standards imply that appellate review is essential to the fair 
administration of the criminal law:  “The possibility of appellate review of 
trial court judgments should exist for every criminal conviction. It is 
undesirable to have any class of case in which such trial court determinations 
are unreviewable.”142 
Thus, an interrelated set of principles, including public policy 
statements and basic principles of procedural due process, the doctrines of 
structural error and Winship sufficiency of the evidence review, and appeal-
waiver limitations, strongly suggests that a right to appeal is so engrained in 
our expectations of the administration of criminal justice that it has achieved 
constitutional status. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 138  United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995). 
 139  Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); see Cuypers v. State, 711 N.W.2d 
100, 104 (Minn. 2006) (noting that there is no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in 
the pretrial context). Thus, if a defendant exercises his right to seek suppression of evidence 
on Fourth Amendment grounds, the prosecutor may increase the charges without facing a 
presumption of vindictiveness.  U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982). On the other 
hand, if a defendant exercises his non-constitutional right to an appeal, due process requires 
that the prosecutor overcome a presumption of vindictiveness. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28. 
 140  See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (recognizing an indigent 
appellant’s right to appointed counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19–20 
(1956) (recognizing an indigent appellant’s right to transcript at public expense). It may be 
telling that the Supreme Court recognized an indigent defendant’s right to an attorney on 
appeal in Douglas on the same day it recognized the right to counsel at trial in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, although the constitutional right to a trial is not matched by a similar right to 
appeal. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (decided Mar. 18, 
1963), with Douglas, 372 U.S. at 353 (decided Mar. 18, 1963). 
 141  4 ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 21-1.3(a) (2d ed. 1980). 
 142  Id. at § 21-1.1(a). 
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E. Applying Kahn v. Griffin 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court will decline to depart from federal 
precedent based “on some slight implication and vague conjecture.”143 The 
court will provide greater protection under the state constitution, however, if 
there is “a principled basis to do so.”144 Applying the Kahn “decision tree,” 
the right to appeal involves “concerns [] and traditions unique to 
Minnesota.”145 These are the “right to one review,” which Deegan suggests 
may be a “tradition unique to Minnesota,” the limited Spann rule against 
waiver of the right to appeal, and the exacting Minnesota standard for 
appellate review of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a 
conviction.146 
 It could be argued that these are not sufficient “concerns[] and 
traditions unique to Minnesota” to justify departing from the McKane “no 
constitutional right to appeal” rule. The Kahn court, however, indicated its 
willingness to depart from federal constitutional precedent “if we determine 
that federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights 
and liberties.”147  
The Leo Frank case may exaggerate any current need for appellate 
correction, but public opinion can infect the trial of factual questions of guilt 
or innocence in less overt ways.  It is doubtful whether, absent an appeal, 
Riley Housley, who shot a plainclothes police officer who, along with two 
other plainclothes officers, broke down Housley’s door while trying to 
execute a search warrant, would have obtained a careful review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of first-degree assault without an 
appeal. 148  Similarly, without an appeal it is doubtful whether Roger 
Caldwell’s conviction for a highly publicized double murder in Duluth 
would have been reversed based on an error in the fingerprint evidence and 
other trial error.149 
The McKane rule leaves the citizens’ appellate rights at the mercy of 
the state legislature and the rules committee.  It is demonstrably inadequate 
to protect the basic rights and liberties of Minnesota citizens. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 143  Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828. 
 144  Id. at 824. 
 145  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explicating the Kahn decision tree). 
 146  See supra notes 91–98 (describing Minnesota’s right to one review); supra 
notes 134–136 (detailing Spann’s limitation on waiving the right to appeal). 
 147  Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828. 
 148  State v. Housley, 322 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 1982) (reversing the conviction 
for lack of proof that Housley’s “concern for his safety was unreasonable”).  The state 
conceded that Housley was “extremely frightened” when he fired the shots and that he “did 
not hear the warnings given by police” before entry. Id. 
 149  State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 592 (Minn. 1982). 
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VI.  CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT 
  
 A final argument against recognizing the constitutional right to a 
criminal appeal  is based on the consequences of recognizing such a right. 
Recognizing a constitutional right would prevent any legislation or rule 
changes that would deny the right of appeal to any class of criminal 
defendant, such as misdemeanants or defendants who have pleaded guilty.150 
Would it do so at the cost of cumbersome restrictions on the existing 
appellate process? 
 In 1985, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state, 
although not constitutionally required to do so, provides an appeal as of 
right, the conduct of that appeal must “accord with the dictates of the 
Constitution, and in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.”151 
Thus, due process already limits the procedural restrictions Minnesota can 
impose on its criminal appeals.152 
 The First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1987 addressed several 
changes to New Hampshire’s rules of appellate procedure that limited the 
appellate review afforded to criminal defendants.153 The First Circuit applied 
the Mathews balancing test and determined that the new rules allowing the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court to reject a criminal appeal by order (in the 
form of a petition for review), without allowing the appellant access to the 
trial transcript or an opportunity to brief the issues, denied the appellant due 
process.154 Other decisions have similarly emphasized the appellant’s right to 
a transcript, and to some vehicle for presenting argument on the issue(s).155 
 Minnesota provides the indigent criminal defendant the right to a 
transcript.156 Also, Minnesota provides an appeal as of right to all defendants, 
without a screening process similar to New Hampshire’s, in which the 
appellate court can reject an appeal without briefing or review of the 
                                                 
 150  See infra notes 169–171 and accompanying text. 
 151  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985). 
 152  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 153  See, e.g., Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 130–31 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 154  See supra text accompanying note 102 (detailing the factors of the Mathews 
balancing test); Bundy, 815 F.2d at 132. 
 155  See Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 116–19 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
West Virginia’s discretionary appeal procedure did not violate due process because the 
defendant was afforded an attorney and access to the transcript, and the attorney made an oral 
presentation on the case); Wood v. State, 990 P.2d 786, 791 (Nev. 1999) (holding that 
Nevada’s Fast Track System, which provided an automatic right to appeal, access to a 
transcript, and briefing on the substantive arguments, although in shorter briefs, did not violate 
due process). 
 156  State v. Pederson, 600 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 1999) (holding that an indigent 
defendant appealing his conviction has the right to a transcript at the public expense even if he 
retains private counsel). 
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transcript. 157  The Minnesota Court of Appeals does not use a screening 
process like New Hampshire’s, in which the appellate court could reject an 
appeal without briefing or review of the transcript.158  The court does not 
generally limit the availability of oral argument, except when one party is 
self-represented.159 The court could face a due process challenge to the use of 
unpublished and order opinions. 160  Still, these features of Minnesota 
appellate practice affect the public interest in the development of the law 
more than the individual appellant’s interest in appellate review. 
 In states that have recognized a constitutional right to appeal, 
incorporating the right into the state’s constitution has not led to significant 
restrictions on how appellate courts function. 161  These states generally 
recognize that the constitutional right to appeal may be waived, and that 
issues presented on appeal may be forfeited, if not preserved in the district 
court. 162  Oral argument is not deemed an essential element of a 
constitutionally guaranteed appeal. 163  Elevating the right to appeal to a 
constitutional status has had a procedural impact in broadening the right to a 
transcript and, less significantly, in limiting the application of the “fugitive 
disentitlement rule.”164 
                                                 
 157  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1), amended by 2012 Minn. Ct. Order 0004 
(2012). 
 158  See generally 51 M.S.A., Ct. of App. R. 2 (providing that cases are scheduled 
on a panel calendar in order of filing, with defined exceptions, as soon as one responsive brief 
is filed). 
 159 Id.  The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected the view that due 
process requires that oral argument be available in every case.  FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill 
Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 276 (1949). 
 160  See MINN. STAT. § 484.08, subd. 3(b) (allowing the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals to issue unpublished decisions); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 136.01, subd. 1(a) (allowing 
issuance of unpublished or order opinions). 
 161  See Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 COLO. L. 
REV. 373, 390–99 (1991) (discussing the due process implications of appellate procedures, 
such as staff screening and limits on oral argument). 
 162  See State v. Clayton, 64 So. 3d 418, 421–24 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the 
constitutional provision allowing waiver and holding that the right must be intelligently 
waived); State v. Neff, 181 P.3d 819, 822 (Wash. 2008) (holding that the defendant’s signed 
statement waiving the right to appeal, and his admission that he understood the waiver, 
created a strong presumption that the waiver was valid); Leach v. State, 914 So. 2d 519, 521 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant is not precluded from waiving the state 
constitutional right to appeal); cf. Montgomery v. Sheldon, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (Ariz. 1995) 
(noting that by rule a guilty plea waives right to direct appeal but not all appellate review), 
superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Smith 910 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1996). State v. 
Williams, 206 P.3d 780, 785–86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the defendant forfeited 
his claim on appeal by failing to assert it in the trial court). 
 163 See Wood v. State, 990 P.2d at 791 (holding that fast-track appeal system that 
allowed oral argument only at the court’s discretion did not violate due process); but see 
Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. 
L.J. 1151, 1153 (1981) (arguing that that oral argument is essential to a meaningful appeal). 
 164  See State v. Bright, 860 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
material omissions from the transcript require reversal); State v. Walker, 844 So. 2d 1060, 
1066–67 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the failure to locate missing exhibits that were 
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 Finally, recognizing a constitutional right would not necessarily 
require the courts to provide a more drastic remedy for the denial of the right. 
For example, in Hoagland, where the statutory right was impinged by the 
loss of trial transcripts, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the defendant 
was entitled to a new trial—a significant remedy when a conviction is 
several years old—unless the state could show undue prejudice.165 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
  
 It is time for a fresh look at the “no constitutional right to appeal” 
rule in Minnesota. Statutory and rules-based rights to appeal, however 
longstanding, are not immune from change. 166  As one commentator has 
noted, “judicial review remains extremely vulnerable to democratic politics,” 
particularly at the state level.167 
                                                                                                                   
critical evidence at trial violated the defendant’s constitutional right to appeal); State v. 
Thomas, 852 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a 
record of sufficient completeness to permit effective review, but not necessarily a complete 
verbatim transcript); cf. State v. Schackart, 858 P.2d 639, 644 (Ariz. 1993) (holding that a 
reconstructed trial transcript was adequate for appeal, but record of the sentencing hearing did 
not permit proper review of a death sentence); State v. Ford, 650 So. 2d 808, 810 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial where the unavailability 
of a transcript was due to his own laches in pursuing an appeal). 
 165  Hoagland v. State, 518 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 1994). 
 166  The 1997 Legislature limited defendants’ rights granted under case law to 
appellate review of their sentences in probation-revocation proceedings. 1997 Minn. Laws ch. 
96 § 2, subd. 3 (proposed to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 244.11, subd. 3 (2006)), prior 
version invalidated by State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2006). The 2005 Legislature 
enacted a two-year limitations period on post-conviction filings with certain exceptions. 2005 
Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 14, §§ 12, 13 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 590.01, subd. 4). The 
constitutionality of the two-year limit has been upheld as not violating the right to one review. 
See Larson, 801 N.W.2d at 227. 
 167  Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 459, 465 (1996). Legal commentators in general have not advocated curtailing 
appellate review as a solution to crowded dockets. See Paul Carrington, Crowded Dockets and 
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. 
L. REV. 542, 568 (1969) (stating that the “crisis of congestion” did not yet justify curtailing 
review). A criminal rules committee, such as the one in Minnesota that now oversees Rule 
28.02 and its grant of the right to appeal, may be immune to political pressure, but the 
criminal justice system faces caseload crunches and budgetary constraints. The rules 
committee has recently amended the criminal rules to allow gross misdemeanor defendants, as 
well as misdemeanants, to plead guilty by petition without making a personal appearance. 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.02, subd. 3; 15.03, subd. 2 (amended 2012). Now that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has clarified that misdemeanor appellants are entitled to representation, a 
similar cost-saving measure of limiting or eliminating the right to a misdemeanor appeal is not 
unforeseeable. See State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 158–59 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that 
in the absence of statutory authority placing financial responsibility for misdemeanor 
representation on the Board of Public Defense or the county, the cost should be borne by the 
state). The 2012 Legislature assigned responsibility for representation of misdemeanor 
appellants to the State Public Defender. 2012 Minn. Laws ch. 212, § 14. 
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 In practice, the right to appeal homicide convictions will not 
disappear. It is the appellate rights of misdemeanants subject to local 
incarceration, defendants jailed for municipal ordinance violations, or 
defendants who have pleaded guilty, that need constitutional protection.168 
Removing the right to appeal misdemeanor convictions or convictions based 
on guilty pleas would shield from appellate review, for example, many First 
Amendment issues that arise in disorderly conduct, obstructing legal process, 
and indecent exposure cases, as well as the due process and Sixth 
Amendment issues posed by guilty plea-based convictions.169 
 The right to judicial review of a criminal conviction was provided by 
statute when the Minnesota Constitution was enacted, and may have been 
assumed by its drafters.170 The notion of a right to an “appeal,” although not 
recognized then, has become essential to the modern concept of procedural 
due process as applied to criminal defendants.171  
 The rule-based right of a criminal defendant to a direct appeal should 
be recognized as a constitutional right to protect the right against future 
encroachments. A right so essential should not be left in the hands of a rules 
committee or of the legislative body, which is subject to political pressures. 
The right to appeal a criminal conviction is worthy of state constitutional 
protection. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court is reluctant to depart 
from federal precedent, there is a “principled basis” for departing from the 
McKane rule based on “concerns and traditions unique to Minnesota,” as 
well as the reality that the continued failure to recognize a constitutional 
right to appeal “does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties.”172 
 
                                                 
 168  The states have established differing minimal thresholds for offense-level 
appealability. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 136–42 (1st Cir. 1987) (surveying state 
provisions on the right to criminal appeal). IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 814.6(1)(a), 903.1(1)(a) 
(West 2003); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 28. 
 169  See, e.g., State v. McCarthy, 659 N.W.2d 808, 810–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) 
(concluding that the appellant’s words fit within the “fighting words” limitation of breach of 
disorderly conduct prohibition as applied to verbal conduct); State v. Duncan, 605 N.W.2d 
745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that the indecent exposure statute could 
constitutionally be enforced against nude dancers); State v. Foncesa, 505 N.W.2d 370, 373 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that group advisory for misdemeanor defendants did not 
ensure adequate waiver of the right to counsel); State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875, 878 
(Minn. 1988) (concluding that obstructing the legal process statute was not facially overbroad 
or unconstitutionally vague). 
 170  See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (exploring the history of 
Minnesota’s Constitution and statutes enacted during the time it was drafted). 
 171  See supra notes 99–123 and accompanying text (outlining the rights protected 
under state and federal procedural due process rules). 
 172  Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 824–25, 828. 
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